Implicitly, Welch and Clegg seem to indicate a harmonious evolution of atomistic physiology with a continuous progression of empirical knowledge which is integrated into a rather stable conceptual framework, e.g., the structure-function relationship. If that were the case, I would welcome such a view because it would support results obtained earlier (4) and therefore strengthen a position which is not shared by other philosophers of science (2, 6, 7).
Unfortunately, careful readers of the article are left alone to establish their own concepts of the theoretical backgrounds of systemic cell and protoplasmic theory. However, a metatheoretical approach is highly desirable for a study which, in the first place, proclaims protoplasmic theory to be the key 19th-century construct that drove the development toward modern theories of elementary particles. There are studies which show that the dualist view, cell versus protoplasm, is obtained from within the tradition of physiology and is also important for psychological reasons (4) . In this regard, the historical part of the study by Welch and Clegg is indebted to this influential tradition, and therefore their presentation is susceptible to misguidance. From a more or less independent metatheoretical point of view, which has evolved in the philosophy of science, the relevance of this distinction vanishes. Thus, it can be shown that, e.g., the search for mechanisms is one concept which collides neither with cell nor with protoplasmic theory (1, 3) . Other studies (4, 5) have revealed a fundamental logical structure of explanation of atomistic biological theories which is also more general and unifying than the commonly advocated dichotomy.
Since at least some concrete results of epistemology may be of interest for the current theory of physiology, I would like to outline a few pivotal elements of the classical cell theory of 1839. This model case will be employed here, ironically, to demonstrate its protoplasmic character: The empirically founded concept of a quasi-crystalline substance (my terminology) is used to establish an internal atomistic structure of the entire cell which, at the same time, furnishes all parts of the cell with a ubiquitous solid-liquid interface. A quasi-crystalline substance is conceptualized as the product of an incomplete crystallization or, in other words, as the type of matter that is obtained by absorbing more water molecules into its crystal lattice than the normal fraction of bound water. In the precolloidal era of chemistry (4), this porous architecture (I do not want to say fractal, but I would like to mention the mathematical tendency of this concept as has been indicated in a sensible review given by Purkinje) enables the elegant extension of this theoretical root by joining it to the concept of catalytic surface activity. This newly discovered concept was employed by some chemists to explain the fermentation process induced by yeast-and also by the author of the classical theory to explain the active principle of the ferment pepsin. These concepts so far are thought to provide for plastic and metabolic changes of the cell and, finally, allow for a logically consistent explanation of the complete cell cycle excluding spontaneous generation (4, 5). What we have here in a nutshell are the physiological (protoplasmic?) principles scattered through the third, fourth, and fifth sections of the article which is under discussion. What would one need to produce a cell theory from those heuristic principles of the classical theory? Might the original complex have been shaped into cell or protoplasmic theory due to a perspective that has its proper mode of explanation-a fact that may have been exploited by schools of later times? For the latter, the answer is in the affirmative if one recurs to principles underlying an analytical history of science (4) .
Naming a physiological theory, listing elements of its contents, examining its internal structure or its logical mode of explanation, looking at both its completeness and range of application, and comparing or associating it with other theories are different tasks that one should try to keep apart. To separate these interrelated problems, I would like to encourage future historical reflections, also for the sake of their usefulness to the reader, to account for the logical structure of explanation in the context of presenting physiological theories. In this sense, I am convinced that the survey of Welch and Clegg will serve as a valuable starting point for further epistemological research pertaining to cell physiology.
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